In game theory, a repeated prisoner’s dilemma can become a stag hunt if the probability of future interaction is high enough. Which is essentially what you’re saying.
Prisoner’s dilemmas are interesting because cooperation is socially optimal but not sustained by a Nash equilibrium. Cooperation is fragile. It’s a little “doom and gloom.” Are social species destined to be individualistic selfish assholes?
Under certain conditions, a repeated prisoner’s dilemma becomes a stag hunt. Stag hunts are interesting because cooperation is, in fact, sustained by a Nash equilibrium. But it’s not for free: there’s also a suboptimal Nash equilibrium that could be hard to get out of.
But the moral is that there’s incentive to not be an asshole if there’s a high probability of future encounters.
In game theory, a repeated prisoner’s dilemma can become a stag hunt if the probability of future interaction is high enough. Which is essentially what you’re saying.
I’m familiar with the prisoners dilemma but not the stag hunt aspect, I’ll have to take your word for it until I have time to read up on that.
Prisoner’s dilemmas are interesting because cooperation is socially optimal but not sustained by a Nash equilibrium. Cooperation is fragile. It’s a little “doom and gloom.” Are social species destined to be individualistic selfish assholes?
Under certain conditions, a repeated prisoner’s dilemma becomes a stag hunt. Stag hunts are interesting because cooperation is, in fact, sustained by a Nash equilibrium. But it’s not for free: there’s also a suboptimal Nash equilibrium that could be hard to get out of.
But the moral is that there’s incentive to not be an asshole if there’s a high probability of future encounters.