• Fedora@lemmy.haigner.me
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    1 year ago

    I’m curious why they want this instead of mTLS certificates? This smells like secret services counseled Europe using a front company. But that wouldn’t surprise me, since similar events happened multiple times in the past.

    • Skull giver@popplesburger.hilciferous.nl
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      1 year ago

      Why would the secret services need a front company? France, Spain, and The Netherlands all operate or have operated normal certificate authorities. If this ends up rolling out, abuse alert systems will be built in. Just because CT cannot be used to verify the certificate doesn’t mean the individual certificates can’t be uploaded to a central store where they can be audited in public.

      mTLS sucks, mostly because of the 2003 era UI browsers pack for it. Honestly, the entire system can be replaced by a basic smart card or even a government-provided Yubikey. Because of the EU being the EU, they’re just more than five or ten years behind the times. An EV program made a lot of sense back in 2010.

      • Fedora@lemmy.haigner.me
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        1 year ago

        Why would the secret services need a front company?

        Governments here must use public tenders to buy services, and they pick the offer with the lowest price. Secret services can eat operational costs to place an extraordinarily competitive bid, but governments usually have anti-spying regulations. Hence, secret services bid with front companies.

        But why bid in the first place, you may ask? eGovernment services are an attractive target due to the sensitive information at stake, and the potential to influence laws related to the eGovernment services. Secret services implement eGovernment services in a way that allows them to gain intelligence.

        But how can they implement services in such a way, you may ask? Ask forgiveness, not permission. Of course, bullshit justifications play an important role here. E2EE? Why do that? Do you not want to scan files that go through the system for viruses? Real justification for why De-Mail stores sensitives emails in plaintext.

        Governments now have the following options:

        • Discard their paid work and forget about the initiative.
        • Discard their paid work and contract someone more expensive than the original bidder.
        • Pass laws to allow how the insecure service operates.

        Remember De-Mail? Yeah, that exists. Exceptions that allow insecure storage of sensitive emails as long as it’s De-Mail. Exceptions that allow De-Mail providers to send legally binding emails on behalf of everyone. No, I’m serious. If anybody comprises De-Mail providers, they can practically send legally binding emails on behalf of everyone, as long as they don’t leave behind any trails of course.

        But sometimes, like here I suspect, secret services hit the jackpot. They’ve got such an insecure implementation that the laws required to allow the service to operate nullifies the security of a large portion of the internet. Now, if enforced, they can intercept traffic like they used to back when everyone ran on http without the s. SIGINT is dead, long live SIGINT!